The value relevance of voluntary disclosure in the annual report by Banghøj, Jesper & Plenborg, Thomas
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The value relevance of voluntary disclosure in the annual report 
 
 
 
Assistant Professor Jesper Banghøj  
 
Professor Thomas Plenborg 
 
Copenhagen Business School 
Department of Accounting and Auditing 
Solbjerg Plads 3 
DK-2000 Frederiksberg 
Denmark 
 
Phone +45 38152320 
Fax +45 38152321 
 
E-mail: 
jb.acc@cbs.dk 
tp.acc@cbs.dk  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We gratefully acknowledge the helpful comments from Christian Petersen, Peter Ove 
Christensen, Bent Jesper Christensen, Frank Thinggaard, Johannes Raaballe and seminar 
participants at Aarhus University.
 
The value relevance of voluntary disclosure in the annual report 
 
Abstract 
This paper examines if the level of voluntary disclosure affects the association between current 
returns and future earnings. Economic theory suggests that firms might find it advantageous to 
provide additional pieces of information (i.e., voluntary disclosure) to investors and analysts 
(Verrecchia 1983). Our results indicate that more voluntary disclosure does not improve the 
association between current returns and future earnings; i.e. current returns do not reflect more 
future earnings news. This finding raises the question whether voluntary information in the annual 
report contains value relevant information about future earnings or if investors are simply not 
capable of incorporating voluntary information in the firm value estimates. 
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The value relevance of voluntary disclosure in the annual report 
Introduction 
This study examines whether a higher level of voluntary disclosure in the annual report reduces the 
information gap (asymmetry) between companies and investors in Denmark. A primary objective of 
disclosure is to inform analysts and investors about the amount, timing and uncertainty of future 
earnings (cash flows); i.e. disclosure helps analysts and investors to predict future earnings. Several 
studies document that a better disclosure practice improve analysts’ forecast accuracy of next year’s 
earnings (e.g. Lang and Lundholm, 1996). However, their results may simply reflect that firms 
manage their analyst relationship better. Thus, we take these results one step further by conjecturing 
that voluntary (disclosure) information in the annual report on future earnings is reflected in current 
stock prices. This implies that firms with a high level of (value relevant) voluntary disclosure have a 
stronger association between current stock returns and future earnings than firms with a low level of 
(value relevant) disclosure. Thus, our (alternative) hypothesis is that the level of voluntary disclosure 
improves the association between current stock returns and future earnings. 
 
Only a few studies have addressed this problem. Lundholm and Myers (2002) and Gelb and Zarowin 
(2002) are notably exceptions. Based on US data both studies find that firms with relatively more 
informative disclosures ‘bring the future forward’ so that current stock returns reflect more future 
earnings news. However, Gelb and Zarowin (2002) also find that enhanced annual report 
disclosures do not make current stock prices more informative. This result seriously questions the 
usefulness of voluntary disclosure in the annual report. As no disclosure index is available in 
Denmark, it has been necessary to construct one on Danish firms. Our disclosure index purely relies 
on information from the annual report and our results are therefore comparable with the ones 
reported in Gelb and Zarowin (2002). 
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Our study documents an increased level of disclosure across time. The level of voluntary disclosure, 
as measured in this study, increases by approximately 40 percent during the period 1996-2000. Our 
empirical results support the findings in Gelb and Zarowin (2002). Despite an increased level of 
voluntary disclosure we find that voluntary disclosure from the annual report does not improve the 
association between current stock returns and future earnings. In fact, in some of the alternative 
specifications we find that a higher level of voluntary disclosure in the annual report reduces the 
association between current returns and future earnings. While the objective of the annual report is 
to provide useful information to the stakeholders, investors in Danish companies have not benefited 
from an improved level of voluntary disclosure. This raises the question whether voluntary 
information in the annual report does not contain value relevant information about future 
performance or if investors are simply not capable of incorporating voluntary information in the firm 
value estimates. 
 
The Copenhagen Stock Exchange is a small stock exchange with only 185 listed companies in 2004. 
In 2004 the OMXC20 index comprising the 20 blue chips stocks accounted for approximately 76% 
of the total market value and 79% of total turnover (Copenhagen Stock Exchange, 2005). As such 
the CSE has the features of a typical continental European market. This supports that results from 
this study may be generalised to other settings than the US. 
 
In her speech at the AAA meeting Schipper (2005) argues that investors underweight (or ignore 
altogether) disclosures. Hence, she points out that it is important to improve our understanding of 
how the market reads disclosure in the annual report. In a review of the empirical disclosure 
literature Healy and Palepu (2000) find that nearly all studies on disclosure are based on US data. 
They question whether the results from the US can be generalised to non-US countries characterised 
by a different institutional setting. For example, Hope (2002) finds that firms’ disclosure practices 
vary substantially across countries. This may imply that disclosure serves different purposes and that 
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the value relevance of the disclosure, therefore, may vary substantially across countries. More 
specifically, does disclosure have the same effect on the association between current stock returns 
and future earnings? While both the US and Denmark are considered as developed countries there 
are several institutional differences that may affect the impact of voluntary disclosure on the 
association between current stock returns and future earnings. 
 
Danish corporate ownership structure generally reflects an institutional setting that is similar to most 
non-US countries, where frequent heavily-concentrated shareholdings and controlling ownership are 
prevalent (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997, pp. 754-55). Pedersen and Thomsen (1996) document that the 
existence of dual stock classes in Denmark is related to a higher level of family ownership and 
shareholder concentration than in the US. Warfield et al. (1995) find that the mean percentage of 
shares owned by US managers is 17 percent, while Gabrielsen et al. (2002) find that the mean 
percentage of shares owned by Danish managers is as high as 59 percent. The existence of more 
heavily concentrated shareholdings and controlling ownership in Denmark may imply different 
reporting practices. For example, firms with high ownership concentration may be reluctant to 
provide voluntary disclosure since owners have alternative ways (inside) of getting information. 
Consequently, the market for voluntary disclosure may not be as developed in Denmark as in the 
US, which reduces the chances that voluntary disclosure is used as a mean to diminish the 
information asymmetry. 
 
On the other hand, Warfield et al (1995) argue that because of greater ownership concentration, 
companies are more likely to disclose accounting information that reflects firm economics. Other 
research supports this position. Grossmann and Hart (1980) and Shleifer and Vishny (1986) find that 
in firms with many shareholders, it is not worthwhile for an individual investor to monitor 
management’s performance. According to the monitoring ‘theory’ in a setting like the Danish with a 
high level of ownership concentration it is likely that voluntary disclosure is used as a mean to 
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reduce the information asymmetry. Large shareholders will discipline the management to produce 
value relevant information that will reduce the information asymmetry. 
 
The above considerations suggest that different ownership concentrations most likely will have an 
impact on firms’ disclosure policy. However, it is not possible to predict a priori how the ownership 
concentration affects the relationship between the level of disclosure and the prediction of future 
earnings. 
 
Expected litigation costs affect managers’ and auditors’ disclosure decisions (Kothari et al., 1988). 
The expected costs are a function of lawsuit probability, award size and legal fees. In countries with 
high litigation costs, the reliability of the disclosure may be emphasised above relevance (Baginski 
et al., 2002). In line with Ball et al. (2000) we expect that litigation costs in the US is relatively 
higher than in the UK and code-law countries. Litigation costs in Denmark are very similar to the 
UK. Thus, an emphasis on relevant disclosure at the expense of reliable disclosure may be relatively 
more likely in a less litigious environment as the Danish. If investors prefer information, which is 
relevant albeit less reliable, we expect to find support for our hypothesis, i.e. that the level voluntary 
disclosure reduces the information asymmetry and thereby improve the association between current 
stock returns and future earnings. 
 
An American company must prepare a 10-K statement as requested by the Security and Exchange 
Commission (SEC). This statement gives investors a broad insight into a firm’s operations. Danish 
firms, on the other hand, are subject to a high degree of freedom when choosing how much 
information to disclose in the annual report. Hope (2002) also finds that the enforcement of 
accounting information varies substantially between the US and Denmark. He finds that the 
regulatory environment in the US is much more efficient than the regulatory environment in 
Denmark. As pointed out by Hope (2002), in the absent of adequate enforcement, even the best 
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accounting standards will be inconsequential. The more detailed accounting regulation in the US 
combined with a better regulatory environment is likely to reduce information asymmetry. This 
study contributes to the literature by examining whether companies in a setting with a modest level 
of accounting regulation ‘fill out the information gap’ through voluntary disclosure and thereby 
improve investor protection. If Danish companies succeed in reducing the information gap 
(asymmetry) there are reasons to believe that the association between current stock returns and 
future earnings will improve. 
 
Finally, with the implementation of the Danish Financial Accounting Act as of January 1, 2002 and 
the requirement that all listed companies in EU must comply with IAS standards from 2005 more 
openness in the annual accounts is required. Evidence from Danish listed companies may therefore 
shred new light on firms’ disclosure policy. If the level of voluntary disclosure reduces information 
asymmetry it may lead to better prediction of future earnings by investors after the implementation 
of IFRS standards in 2005. 
 
The remaining of this paper is organized as follows. The next section contains a literature review. In 
the third section the research design is outlined. The sample selection and descriptive statistics are 
provided in the fourth section, followed by the empirical results and sensitivity checks. Conclusions 
and suggestions for future research appear in the final section. 
 
Relation to prior literature 
It is often argued that firms might find it advantageous to provide additional pieces of information 
(i.e., voluntary disclosure) to investors and analysts through the annual report. If a firm withhold 
information from the market, investors become suspicious about the quality of investment and 
discount its quality to the point where managers always are better off with a full disclosure policy 
(Verrecchia, 1983).  On the other hand, Edwards and Smith (1996) find that one third of the 
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participants in a survey believe that an increased level of disclosure leads to a loss of competitive 
advantage (disclosure costs). Hope (2002) also demonstrates that firms’ disclosure practices vary 
substantially across countries. Thus, the level of disclosure varies both across countries and 
companies. 
 
Prior studies attempting to empirically assess the benefits of enhanced disclosure practices mainly 
focus on the benefits to the disclosing firm. For example, Botosan (1997) finds that firms that are 
not closely followed by financial analysts experience lower cost of capital with increases in 
disclosure. In a similar study Botosan and Plumlee (2002) create three disclosure indices based on 
information from the annual report, other publications and investor relations, respectively. They find 
contrary to expectations that the overall disclosure level is not associated with a lower cost of equity 
capital. Sengupta (1998) provides evidence that firms with high disclosure quality ratings from 
financial analysts enjoy lower costs of issuing debt. Based on German and Swiss data, respectively, 
Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) and Hail (2002) find a negative association between disclosure and 
various proxies for cost of capital. In the only study on disclosure in Denmark, Petersen and 
Plenborg (2006) find that voluntary disclosure is negatively associated with proxies for information 
asymmetry.1
 
Lang and Lundholm (1996) find that the level of analysts’ disagreement (i.e. earnings forecast) to be 
driven by the quality of management disclosures. They argue that as firms disclose more value 
relevant information, analysts will rely more on the disclosed information in preparing their earnings 
forecast. Their empirical findings also show that enhanced disclosure practices is associated with 
more accurate analysts’ forecasts. In a European study Vanstraelen et al. (2003) find that the 
voluntary disclosure of forward-looking information is associated with significantly lower 
dispersion levels and higher accuracy of analysts’ earnings forecast. On the other hand, voluntary 
disclosure on historical information does not affect either the dispersion or accuracy of analysts’ 
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earnings forecasts. Contrary to Lang and Lundholm and Vanstraelen et al. this study measures the 
association between current returns and future earnings directly, rather than relying on proxies such 
as analyst forecasts. As pointed out by Gelb and Zarowin (2002, 35), “more accurate analyst 
forecasts might be evidence of firms ‘managing’ their analyst relationships better (i.e. whisper 
numbers), rather than evidence that there are economically important and empirically detectable 
benefits of enhanced disclosure, which suggest that enhanced disclosure might make prices more 
informative”. 
 
Only a few studies have examined if enhanced disclosure is associated with stock prices that are 
more informative about future earnings. Miller and Piotroski (2000) find that when firms include 
forward-looking statements in their quarterly earnings announcements, the announcement-period 
stock returns are more highly associated with the next quarter’s earnings information. Lundholm and 
Myers (2002) find that firms with relatively more informative disclosures ‘bring the future forward’ 
so that current stock returns reflect more future earnings news. In a similar study, Gelb and Zarowin 
(2002) obtain a better association between current stock returns and future earnings for companies 
with better disclosure practices. Gelb and Zarowin (2002) also examine the usefulness of three 
disclosure indices.2 They find that enhanced annual report disclosures do not make current stock 
prices more informative. In summary, our literature review supports that a firm’s disclosure practice 
affects the association between current returns and future earnings. However, the disclosure from the 
annual report does not contain value relevant information about future earnings. 
 
Research design 
This section discusses the methodology adopted and the construction of the disclosure index. 
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Methodology 
Our approach to measuring current and future earnings news in current returns follows the work of 
Kothari and Sloan (1992), Collins et al. (1994), Lundholm and Myers (2002) and Gelb and Zarowin 
(2002). Based on the observation that accounting recognition lags stock returns in measuring value 
creation, these papers add future earnings into the regression of current returns on current earnings. 
Collins et al. (1994) apply the following specification: 
 
∑
=
++ +∆++=
3
1
110 ,)(
i
tittitt XEUXR εβββ     (1) 
where 
 
Rt = Annual stock returns 
UX = Unanticipated earnings 
∆E(X) = Revision in market expectations from the beginning of period t 
 
Collins et al. limit i to three years. They find that current returns do not significantly anticipate 
earnings changes more than three years ahead. 
 
Since the independent variables are not directly observable we apply the level of Xt and Xt-1as proxy 
for UX. Thus, our specification becomes: 
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As pointed out by Lundholm and Myers, by including Xt-1 we allow the regression to find the best 
representation of the prior expectation of current earnings. If the coefficient of Xt-1 is negative (but 
of similar magnitude) the earnings follow a random walk. If the coefficient on Xt-1 is zero then 
earnings is being treated as white noise. Consistent with prior literature we expect the coefficients on 
Xt and Xt+i to be positive. 
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 Collins et al (1994) point out an error in variables problem. In the specification (2) we apply realised 
future earnings as proxy for expected future earnings, but realised earnings has both expected and 
unexpected components, so this proxy contains measurement error. Collins et al. (1994) include 
future stock returns in the regressions to control for the unexpected component of future earnings. In 
an efficient market, the unexpected components will be reflected in future stock returns. 
Accordingly, we include future returns as a control variable. 
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In general, future returns should be uncorrelated with current returns in a regression excluding future 
earnings. Collins et al. (1994) find that the sign on future returns is negative and significant, which 
indicates that irrelevant components related to future returns are removed from future earnings, 
leaving a better approximation to the changes in expectations of future earnings that occurred in 
period t. 
 
We assume that companies that disclose information about future earnings will improve the 
association between current returns and future earnings. On the other hand, companies that do not 
disclose information about future earnings will experience a weaker association between current 
returns and future earnings. Thus, there is an interaction between future earnings and the current 
level of a firm’s disclosure which we incorporate in the regression as follows: 
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D is the disclosure score. We hypothesise that the association between current return and future 
earnings will improve for firms that disclose (current) information about future earnings; i.e. 
disclosures that reveal information about the future earnings potential will be incorporated in the 
current stock prices by investors. The coefficient on the interaction term Xt+i⋅Dt is therefore expected 
to be positive. We don’t have any prediction on the coefficient on the interaction term Rt+i⋅Dt. 
 
There are 17 variables in (4). In addition we add a number of control variables. Thus, in the interest 
of parsimony we apply a reduced version of (4): 
 
tttttttt
ttt
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+++++=
−
−
39387165
34332110    (5) 
 
where 
R3 = The buy and hold return for three years period following t. The buy and hold return is 
measured as 4 months after the fiscal year-end t to 4 months after the fiscal year-end 
t+3.  
X3 = The sum of annual earnings for three years following t, all deflated by the market 
value of equity four months after t-1 fiscal year-end. 
 
By aggregating three years of data we force each year to have the same coefficient. On the other 
hand, we reduce the number of independent variables from 17 to 9. Lundholm and Myers (2002) 
also adopt the approach and they obtain identical results with models (4) and (5). As sensitivity test 
we also run model (4) allowing the coefficients on future earnings and future returns to vary across 
time. 
 
Previous studies have documented that the level of disclosure is correlated with ownership 
concentration, size and leverage. Petersen and Plenborg (2006) find a negative correlation between 
ownership concentration and a firm’s disclosure score. Neither Gelb and Zarowin (2002) nor 
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Lundholm and Myers (2002) control for ownership concentration. Further, Lang and Lundholm 
(1993) find that firms with higher disclosure scores are larger than firms with lower scores. Ahmed 
and Courtis (1999) provide a meta analysis of 23 separate studies of the association between the 
disclosure level in the annual reports and various firm characteristics. They find that leverage is 
correlated with disclosure level. Thus, ownership concentration, size and leverage are included in (5) 
as control variables. In addition, Lundholm and Myers (2002) also include past growth, risk, and 
presence of accounting loss as control variables. To rule out that our disclosure score is merely a 
proxy for these determinants of the earnings response coefficient we also include them as additional 
control variables. 
 
Leverage is defined as book value of equity scaled by total liabilities. Growth is measured as the 
percentage growth in total assets from period t-1 to t. Loss is an indicator variable that equals 1 
when earnings is negative and zero otherwise. Beta (risk) is estimated via a market model regression 
using at least 24 of the 60 monthly return observations for the year in question (e.g., 1996) and the 
preceding four years. The accounting variables (i.e. earnings, book value of equity, total liabilities, 
and total assets) and monthly stock returns (prices) are retrieved from Datastream.4 Size (MV) is 
measured as the log of market value of a firm’s equity. Ownership concentration (Owner) is 
measured as shares held by blockholders including officers, directors (and their families), trusts, 
pension/benefit plans, and shares held by other firms or individuals that hold more than 5%. The 
data is obtained from Worldscope International Database, Greens and annual reports.5 Since Danish 
ownership data are both difficult and extremely time consuming to collect we use ownership data for 
1998 as proxy for the entire period, 1996-2000. A similar assumption is introduced in previous 
ownership studies such as Warfield et al. (1995) on US data and Gabrielsen (2002) on Danish data. 
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Construction of the disclosure index 
Most prior studies on disclosure used data from the Association of Investment Management and 
Research (AIMR) as a proxy for firms’ disclosure policy. Every year AIMR publishes a disclosure 
index for almost 500 firms comprising 22 different industries based on a number of financial 
analysts assessment of the selected industries disclosure policy. Only a few studies (e.g., Botosan, 
1997) created their own disclosure index. As no disclosure index that resembles the one by AIMR is 
available in Denmark, it has been necessary to construct a similar one on Danish firms. The design 
of the index is inspired by earlier studies and reports as for example, Jenkins (1994), Botosan 
(1997), PwC ValueReporting (1999) and the Nørby (2001)6 Common to these studies is the focus on 
investors’ need. Our disclosure index purely relies on information from the annual report and is 
based on the following five subcategories: 1) Strategy, 2) Competition and outlook, 3) Production, 
4) Sales and marketing, and 5) Human capital.7
 
A total of 62 indicators within the five groups have been identified (see exhibit A). The Financial 
Statement Act does not require disclosure of any of those indicators. Thus, disclosing any of the 62 
indicators is entirely voluntary.8 Even though the ‘level of disclosure’ is measured by the number of 
indicators (i.e., quantitative measure), they should also be qualitative in order to be informative. As 
our index is based on prior research and reports, it provides some evidence, albeit indirectly, that the 
indicators are qualitative as well. 
 
By assigning points for each of the 62 information indicators a firm disclose, each firm gets a score 
on the disclosure index. Since one point is assigned for each piece of information in the annual 
report the maximum score is 62. This scoring procedure differs from the one that Botosan (1997) 
uses, as she awards each quantitative measure a score of two and each qualitative measure a score of 
one. She argues that quantitative measures are more precise than qualitative measures. Even though 
quantitative measures may be more precise, that is, more reliable, qualitative measures may be more 
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relevant.  Arguably, qualitative information may in some cases provide investors with a better 
understanding of firm characteristics that determines the future earnings potential. Consequently, 
this study assigns an equal score to each of the two measures. Finally, only one point is given for 
each piece of information even if this piece of information appears more than once in the annual 
report. 
 
Sample selection and descriptive statistics 
Sample selection 
This study includes 36 industrial firms listed on the Copenhagen Stock Exchange. We use the annual 
reports for the period 1996 – 2000 to construct the disclosure score.9 The reports were carefully 
examined, and the relevant pieces of voluntary disclosure were extracted for each of the five 
disclosure indices. The final sample of 36 firms was selected as follows. In order to obtain variety in 
disclosure level a large sample is preferable. However, we focus on only one industry to control for 
other factors besides disclosure that affect the relation between current returns and future earnings. 
Since firms in an industry are homogeneous in their real activities and most likely adopt similar 
accounting practice (White et al. 2003) their earnings should have similar timeliness and forecast 
ability. The Copenhagen Stock Exchange industrial index consists of 58 firms, and was chosen since 
it is the largest index (i.e., the one including the largest number of firms). Within this group the 
subgroup 2010 Industrial goods has been selected comprising 45 firms. Thus, 13 firms in the 
subgroups ‘Commercial Service Suppliers’ and ‘Transportation’ were deselected as those firms 
differ from the majority of other industrial firms as they do not have any physical production line. 
Finally, a total of nine firms were eliminated to avoid double counting, as those nine firms are 
represented in the industrial index by two stock classes. The final sample consists of 36 firms 
covering the period 1996 – 2000 totalling 152 firm-year observations.10
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Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 provides summary statistics for our sample. The mean (median) current return is 7.3% 
(2.4%). The mean (median) current earnings (deflated by market value) is 11.1% (9.9%). The mean 
(median) accumulated three year earnings is as expected roughly three times the size of current 
earnings. On the other hand, future returns is negative which may indicate structural changes in the 
returns over sample time. A closer look at the returns reveals that differences in measurement 
periods explain the differences between current and future returns. Current returns are measured in 
the time period 1996-2000 while future returns are measured in the time period 1997-2003. For 
example, future returns are not affected by the strong (current) returns of 32% in 1996. Further, 
future returns are affected by poor (negative) stock market performance in 2001 and 2002. The 
negative value on future returns may affect the measure’s ability to proxy for measurement error in 
future earnings (the unexpected component of future earnings).11  
 
(INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE) 
 
Our sample consists of companies that are slightly bigger than the average company on the stock 
exchange. While the median market value of equity for companies listed at the stock exchange is 
972 mio. DKK in the time period examined the median market value of equity for companies 
included in our sample is 1,165 mio. DKK. 
 
As evidenced by table 1b the mean (median) disclosure score is increasing over time from 9.9 (11.0) 
in 1996 to 14.6 (14.0) in 2000. This trend is the same for all five subcategories. The score for 
strategy, competition and production is significantly higher than for marketing strategy and human 
resource. For 2000 the score on strategy was the highest score, suggesting that management find 
information about strategy an important issue. Even though the firms of today are increasingly 
 15
dependent upon intangible resources at large, including know-how and skills of employees, 
disclosure on human capital (HR) is still fairly low.12  
 
(INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE) 
 
Table 2 provides correlations between the dependent and independent variables. As documented in 
previous studies current returns (R) are strongly correlated with both current (X) and future earnings 
(X3). Further, current returns are uncorrelated with future returns (R3). Future returns, on the other 
hand, are significantly correlated with future earnings (X3), consistent with Collins et al. (1994). 
These correlations indicate that future returns should not influence the results except through their 
role as a proxy for the measurement error in future earnings. 
 
The coefficient on the correlation between current returns and the disclosure score is only 5% and 
insignificant. This indicates that the disclosure practice in Danish companies is not necessarily 
driven by current performance. Lundholm and Myers (2002) find a positive and significant 
correlation between current returns and the disclosure score. However, their correlation coefficient is 
only 3% which indicates that the significance level is affected by the sample size (n = 4,478). Size 
measured as the market value of equity is correlated with disclosure. Thus, larger companies seem to 
have a more rigorous information policy. This is consistent with the results reported in Lang and 
Lundholm (1993). They find that firms with higher disclosure scores are larger than companies with 
lower scores. The correlations between the independent variables are in general modest and 
multicollinearity does not seem be an issue. 
 
Empirical results 
In the spirit of Lundholm and Myers (2002) we report the results based on specification 5 above. In 
a specification (model 1) similar to Collins et al. (1994) we find that the coefficient on current 
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earnings is positive and significant at the 1% level.13 Further, current returns contain information 
about future earnings. The coefficient on X3 is both positive and significant at the 1% level. This is 
consistent with accounting recognition lags stock returns in measuring value creation. The 
coefficient on R3 is negative and significant at the 1% level indicating that realised future earnings 
contains measurement error that future returns removes. The coefficient on Xt-1 is negative but 
insignificant. The negative sign on Xt-1 suggests that earnings follow a random walk. Thus, based on 
Danish data we obtain results that are similar to the ones in Collins et al. (1994). 
 
(INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE) 
 
In model 2 we include the disclosure score. In general, the results remain similar to the ones 
reported in model 1. The coefficient on X3 is still positive and significant which suggests that 
current returns contain information about future earnings. However, the coefficients on DS and the 
interaction term of DS and X3 are not significantly different from zero. Since DS*X3 and DS*R3 
together proxy for realised future earnings a more powerful test examines the joint significance of 
DS*X3 and DS*R3. The partial F-test of the joint test of these variables is 0.10 and insignificant. 
These results reject the basic idea that disclosures publish in the annual report reveal information 
about future earnings. 
 
In table 3 we apply a model where three years of accumulated earnings is included. However, by 
aggregating three years of earnings we are essentially restricting the coefficient on earnings to be 
similar for each firm year. We therefore run a regression where each year of future earnings and 
future returns are included in the regression separately. The results are reported in table 4. 
 
(INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE) 
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While the sign of the coefficients on Xt-1 and Xt have the expected sign they are not significantly 
different from zero. Only the coefficient on Xt+1 is positive and significantly different from zero 
(10% level). This indicates that our result in table 3 is primarily driven by next year’s earnings. 
Current returns do not contain information about earnings two or three years ahead. This result 
contradicts the findings in Collins et al. (1994) and suggests that current returns in Denmark is less 
informative about future earnings than current returns in the US. More importantly, the coefficient 
on DS remains close to zero. The coefficient on the interaction terms, DS*Xt+i and DS*Rt+i, are in 
general not significantly different from zero. A notably exception is the coefficient on DS*X2 which 
is positive and significant at the 10% level.14 As pointed out above, DS*X3 and DS*R3 together 
proxy for realised future earnings. Consequently, we examine the joint significance of DS*Xt+i and 
DS*Rt+i. The partial F-test of the joint test of these variables is 0.71 and insignificant which 
reinforces that voluntary disclosure from the annual report does not bring future earnings forward in 
time. 
 
We also included yearly indicator variables in the regressions.15 The resulting coefficient estimates 
are consistent with the ones reported in table 3 and the significance levels remain unchanged (not 
tabulated).16
 
In order to examine if some of the information in the disclosure contain value relevant information 
we decompose our disclosure index according to the five categories (strategy, competition and 
outlook, production, sales and marketing, and human capital) and run a regression for each sub-
disclosure index. However, the coefficients on the disclosure index and interaction terms are not 
significantly different from zero (not reported). 
 
(INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE) 
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We also run regressions including the following control variables: leverage, growth, loss indicator, 
risk, size and ownership.17,18 The results are reported in table 5. The results remain qualitatively 
similar to the ones reported in the table 3. For example, the coefficients on DS*X3 and DS*R3 
remain consistently close to zero and insignificant. 
 
While our earnings metric is ordinary earnings Gelb and Zarowin (2002) apply Earnings Before 
Interest, Tax, Depreciation, and Amortisation (EBITDA). As a sensitivity check we replace ordinary 
earnings with EBITDA. However, the results (not tabulated) do not seem be affected by the choice 
of earnings measure. 
 
Collins et al. (1994) and Gelb and Zarowin (2002) apply changes in future earnings rather than a 
level specification.19 Assuming earnings follow a random walk process earnings change is a more 
appropriate specification. We therefore replicate our tests above using earnings change. The results 
(not reported) remain almost identical to the ones based on our level specification. Thus, voluntary 
disclosure does not improve the informativeness of current returns. 
 
As a sensitivity check we replace future returns with growth in investments as a proxy for the 
measurement error in future earnings consistent with Collins et al. 1994. However, the results (not 
reported) remain unchanged. 
 
An explanation for the lack of value relevance of voluntary disclosure may be that many companies 
have a similar reporting practice. Thus, to improve the variation in the disclosure score we examine 
a sub sample including only the companies appearing in the top/bottom quartile of the disclosure 
index. Following this procedure isolate the most/least informative firms but also reduce the sample 
size. The results are reported in table 6. 
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(INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE) 
 
While the coefficient on current earnings is close to zero the coefficient on future earnings is 
positive and significant at the 1% level. Further, the coefficient on DS is positive and significant at 
the 10% level. On the other hand, the coefficient on the interaction term is negative which indicates 
that a higher level of voluntary disclosure reduces the association between current returns and future 
earnings. This works against our hypothesis that voluntary disclosure informs investors about the 
amount, timing and uncertainty of future earnings. As can be seen from table 6 this result remains 
robust across most alternative specifications. The coefficient on the interaction term becomes 
insignificant only when financial leverage and beta are included in the regression. The negative 
coefficient on the interaction between disclosure and future earnings is puzzling given the objective 
of the disclosure in the annual report. 
 
As a last sensitivity test we also examine if companies that improve the level of voluntary disclosure 
across time experience a better association between current returns and future earnings. Specifically, 
we compare the coefficient on the interaction term between the disclosure score and future earnings 
before and after the improved disclosure score. Based on various specifications we are not able to 
detect any material difference in the coefficient on the interaction term (not reported). Thus, this 
result reinforces that voluntary disclosure does not improved the association between current returns 
and future earnings. 
 
Conclusion and future research 
This paper documents industrial firms’ level of disclosure on 62 voluntary issues in the annual 
report which seem important to investors and financial analysts. Across time there is an increase in 
the level of voluntary disclosure. An examination of the impact of voluntary disclosure on the 
association between current returns and future earnings in a setting with high ownership 
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concentration, low litigation costs, low enforcement of accounting information and a flexible 
accounting regime, yields results similar to the ones based on US data which is characterised by a 
different institutional setting. While Lundholm and Myers (2002) and Gelb and Zarowin (2002) find 
that voluntary disclosure affects the association between current returns and future earnings 
positively, Gelb and Zarowin also find that information from the annual report does not affect the 
relationship positively. These results raise the question whether voluntary information in the annual 
report does contain value relevant information about future performance or if investors are simply 
not capable of incorporating voluntary information in the firm value estimates. 
 
The low and in some cases even negative coefficient on the interaction between disclosure and 
future earnings is puzzling given the objective of the disclosure in the annual report. One 
explanation is that the voluntary disclosure misleads analysts’ perception of a company’s future 
earnings potential, i.e. voluntary disclosure does not contain value relevant information about future 
earnings. Another explanation is that investors may simply not be capable of incorporating voluntary 
information in the firm value estimates. Finally, our disclosure index may contain a measurement 
bias. For example, some pieces of information may provide investors with a better understanding of 
firm characteristics that determines the future earnings potential. By assigning one point for each 
piece of (voluntary) information in the annual report we may introduce a measurement error in our 
disclosure index. However, Petersen and Plenborg (2006) apply the same disclosure index and find a 
negative and statistical significant association between the level of disclosure and proxies for 
information asymmetry (bid-ask spread and turnover ratio). Thus, voluntary disclosure seems to 
reduce the level of information asymmetry. Our results, however, show that voluntary disclosure 
does not also make current returns more informative about future earnings. 
 
Our results are of interest to accounting standard setters. While the objective of the disclosure is to 
improve the predictability of future earnings our results (and the results of Gelb and Zarowin) show 
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that voluntary information in the annual report in Denmark (and in the US) does not improve 
investors’ ability to predict future earnings. 
 
Examining the impact of voluntary disclosure on the informativeness of current returns has other 
future avenues. For instance, an analysis (e.g. interviews) that explores how investors apply 
voluntary information may provide insights as to why voluntary information seems value irrelevant.  
Further, future studies may distinct between disclosure that provides information about good and 
bad earnings news, respectively. Basu (1997) has shown that bad earnings news are more timely 
than good earnings news. Thus, one may conjecture that the association between current returns and 
future earnings improves for companies that disclose relatively more good (earnings) news. 
Finally, the analyses and results reported in our paper are based on one industry for a five-year 
period. Thus, the results may not be generalizable to other industries, time periods and/or capital 
markets. These issues could be addressed in future research. 
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1A review of the European Accounting Review, Journal of Business, Finance and Accounting, Accounting and Business 
Research and British Accounting Review over the past eight years (1998-2005) reveals that empirical studies on 
disclosure are rare. 
2 Both Lundholm and Myers (2002) and Gelb and Zarowin (2002) apply the AIMR-FAF disclosure scores. This 
disclosure is based on analyst rank of firms by the informativeness of their disclosures. Scores are given for the 
following three disclosure categories: Annual report, investor relations, and other publications. 
3 Gelb and Zarowin (2002) apply an alternative specification: . We also apply 
the change specification of earnings. However, as shown in the empirical section we obtain results similar to the ones 
applying a level specification. 
4 To ensure the data quality we compared data from Datastream with data from the annual reports. We found that the 
data from Datastream are realiable; i.e. that data from Datastream correspond with data from the annual reports. 
5 In Denmark, investors owning 5 percent or more of a corporation’s stock must report their holdings to the firm, and 
this information is then published with the company’s annual report. In spite of this requirement, the exact voting power 
by an investor is not necessarily known because of the frequent occurrence of dual stock classes. Shares of different 
stock classes normally have different voting rights, but shareholders are not required to report the number of votes 
attached to their holdings. In eight cases it was necessary to approach the company for more detailed information about 
the voting power. 
6 The Nørby report contains recommendations about proper corporate governance. The Copenhagen Stock Exchange 
suggests that firms implement the recommendations from the Nørby committee. 
7 See Botosan (1997:327) for a discussion of advantages and disadvantages of using the AIRM disclosure index versus a 
self constructed disclosure index.  
8 Except in the rare case that the information is needed in order to give ’a true and fair view’. 
9 In order to be able to estimate future earnings 2000 was chosen as the last year. In fact, 2001 could have been used as 
the last year but at the time of the data collection we intended to apply four years of future earnings. 
10 The final sample size is also affected by missing observations and delistings/listings. 
11 As a sensitivity check we replace future returns with growth in investments as a proxy for the measurement error in 
future earnings. This is consistent with Collins et al. 1994 who also apply growth in investments as a proxy for the 
measurement error in future earnings. 
12 The modest focus on HR may simply reflect the nature of industry included in the analysis. 
13 All statistics are reported as two-tailed tests.  
14 The coefficient on X2 remains still negative for ‘high’ disclosure firms (-0.74287+0.07536). 
15 We do not run year-by-year regressions because in some of the sample years, we have only about 26 observations, and 
the models examined estimate up to 21 parameters. 
16 Sensitivity checks that are not reported in tables are available upon request from the authors. 
17 Due to limited number of observations (degree of freedom) only one control variable is included in the model at a 
time. This corresponds to Lundholm and Myers (2002). 
18 By including control variables we expect to reduce the residuals although they will also affect our degree of freedom. 
19 Please note that the level specification adopted in this study is equivalent to using the level of past earnings and the 
change in current and future earnings. 
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Appendix A 
Strategy Marketing strategy 
A statement of corporate goals or objectives is provided? Marketing strategy is provided? 
A general statement of corporate strategy is provided? Sales strategy is described? 
Actions taken to achieve the corporate goal are discussed? Distribution channels are described? 
A time frame for achieving corporate goals is provided? Sales and marketing costs are provided 
Attitude towards ethic questions is provided Brand equity/visibility ratings are discussed? 
Strategy towards environmental issues is provided? Customer turnover rates are discussed? 
Detailed segment performance is provided?* Customer satisfaction level is discussed? 
Changes in ROCE or EVA are provided? Customer mix is discussed? 
Commercial risk assessments are provided? Revenues from new products/services are discussed? 
Financial risk assessments are provided? Order backlog is provided? 
Interest or exchange risks are discussed? Percent of order backlog to be shipped next year is provided? 
Other risk assessments are discussed? Amount of new orders placed this year is provided? 
 Change in inventory is discussed? 
Competition and outlook  
The principal markets are identified? Human Capital 
Specific characteristics of these markets are described? Experience of management team is discussed? 
The market sizes are estimated? Description of workforce is provided? 
Market share are provided? Amount spent on education is provided? 
The competitive landscapes are discussed? Employee retention rates are provided? 
Barriers to entry are discussed? Average revenue per employee is provided? 
The market growths are estimated? Average age of key employees is provided? 
Change in market shares is discussed? Age of key employees is provided? 
Impact of barriers to entry on profits is discussed? Other Measurement of intellectual capital is provided? 
The impact of competition on profits is discussed? Investment in ERP is provided? 
A forecast of market share is estimated? Strategy for measurement of human capital is discussed? 
Impact of barriers to entry on future profits is discussed? Strategy regarding ERP system is discussed? 
The impact of competition on future profits is discussed?  
 
Production 
 
A general description of the business is provided?  
The principal products/services are identified?  
Specific char. of these products/services are described?  
Speed to market is discussed?  
R&D expenditures are discussed?  
Investments in production are discussed?  
Product development cycle is discussed?  
Ratio of inputs to outputs is discussed?  
New products are discussed?  
Rejection/defect rates are discussed?  
Volume of materials consumed is discussed?  
Changes in production methods are discussed?  
Changes in product materials are discussed?  
 
TABLE 1A  
Descriptive Statistics (152 observations)  
Variable        Mean Min 25% 50% 75% Max
Current returns        0.072559 -0.65584 -0.16652 0.02425 0.225362 1.365854
Current earnings 0.110929 -0.87639 0.061137 0.0993 0.17185 
 
0.815636  
3 Year accumulated earnings 0.245348 -1.73423     
        
      
0.050593 0.249902 0.422644 2.168396
3 year accumulated buy and hold return -0.07303 -0.93301 -0.40753 -0.16935 0.276606 1.640964
Market value 1165.034 19.08 106.15 275.13 868.905 
 
45055.79 
 
 
Disclosure score 12.17763 0 7 12 17 30
Current returns (Rt) for year t are the buy and hold returns for the 12 month period starting four months after year 
t-1 fiscal year end. Current earnings (Xt) for the year t is ordinary income, scaled by market value at fiscal year end 
Future earnings (X3t) is the sum of ordinary income for the three years following the current year scaled by market 
value at fiscal year end. Future returns (R3t) are the buy and hold returns for the three year period following the current 
year. Market value is the market value of equity at the fiscal yearend. DS is the disclosure score.  
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Table 1b 
Five types of disclosure scores from 1996-2000 
     DS STRAa COMP PROD MARK HR
   n Meanb Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
1996 26 9,9 11.0 2.6 2.0 2.7 2.0 3.4 3.0 0.8 1.0 0.4 0.0
1997    31 10.3 11.0 2.8 3.0 2.6 2.0 3.5 3.0 0.8 1.0 0.6 0.0
1998    34 12.5 12.5 3.7 4.0 2.9 2.5 3.6 3.0 0.9 0.5 1.4 1.0
1999    32 13.3 12.5 4.0 4.0 2.9 3.0 3.9 4.0 1.1 0.5 1.3 1.0
2000    29 14.6 14.0 4.6 5.0 3.4 3.0 4.3 4.0 1.0 1.0 1.3 1.0
Notes 
a DS is the firms’ individual disclosure score on the 62 indicators. STRA is the firms’ individual disclosure score on strategic issues (12 indicators). 
COMP is the firms’ disclosure score on competitive landscape and outlook (13 indicators). PROD is the firms’ individual disclosure score on 
production details (13 indicators). MARK is the firms’ disclosure score on marketing strategy (13 indicators). HR is the firms’ disclosure score on 
Human capital (11 indicators). 
b n is number of observations. 
 
 
TABLE 2 
Pearson Correlations (p-values) (n=152) 
  Rt Xt-1 Xt X3t R3t DSt MV 
Rt  0.03096 0.30064 0.29248 -0.05954 0.0509 0.11661 
  0.705 0.0002 0.0003 0.4662 0.5335 0.1525 
        
Xt-1   0.41351 0.20582 0.16332 -0.04608 -0.0047 
   0.00001 0.011 0.0444 0.5729 0.9541 
        
Xt    0.44252 0.22049 -0.04299 -0.04169 
    0.00001 0.0063 0.599 0.6101 
        
X3t     0.54521 -0.14554 -0.01594 
     0.00001 0.0736 0.8454 
        
R3t      -0.10214 -0.14433 
      0.2105 0.0761 
        
DSt       0.2299 
              0.0044 
Current returns (Rt) for year t are the buy and hold returns for the 12 month period 
 starting four months after year t-1 fiscal year end. Current earnings (Xt) for the  
year t is ordinary income, scaled by market value at fiscal year end Future earnings 
(X3t) is the sum of ordinary income for the three years following the current year  
scaled by market value at fiscal year end. Future returns (R3t) are the buy and hold 
returns for the three year period following the current year. Market value is the  
market value of equity at the fiscal yearend. DS is the disclosure score. 
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Table 3 
Regression on current returns on current and aggregated future earnings and 
interactions with disclosure (n=152) 
Independent variables Model 1  Model 2  
Intercept -0.04386  -0.08566  
 0.2486  0.3903  
     
Xt-1 -0.17377  -0.83604  
 0.2914  0.2574  
     
Xt 0.47948  0.77901  
 0.008  0.1506  
     
X3t 0.26517  0.40145  
 0.0002  0.0512  
     
R3t -0.22418  -0.15571  
 0.0011  0.3119  
     
DS   0.00418  
   0.5511  
     
DSt*Xt-1   0.03602  
   0.4449  
     
DSt*Xt   -0.01749  
   0.5785  
     
DSt*X3t   -0.01039  
   0.4665  
     
DSt*R3t   -0.00411  
   0.6877  
     
     
Adjusted R2 0.1773   0.1646   
Current returns (Rt) for year t are the buy and hold returns for the 12 month 
period starting four months after year t-1 fiscal year end. Current earnings 
(Xt) for the year t is ordinary income, scaled by market value at fiscal year 
end future earnings (X3t) is the sum of ordinary income for the three years 
following the current year scaled by market value at fiscal year end. Future 
returns (R3t) are the buy and hold returns for the three year period 
following the current year. DS is the disclosure score. 
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TABLE 4 
Regression of Current Returns on Current and future earnings and returns and interactions with disclosure (n=152) 
                                      
                   
Intercept  
                   
                
                   
Xt-1 Xt Xt+1 Xt+2 Xt+3 DS DSt*Xt-1 DSt*Xt DSt*Xt+1 DSt*Xt+2 DSt*Xt+3 R1 R2 R3 DSt*Rt+1 DSt*Rt+2 DSt*Rt+3
Adjusted 
R2
-
0.14614 
-
0.23967 0.83969 1.09832 -0.74287 0.56698 0.00817 -0.00267 -0.02295 -0.06487 0.07536 -0.0307 0.09833 -0.19915 0.09704 -0.00936 -0.00497 -0.01536 0.1721
0.1229 0.5539 0.1592 0.0701 0.2221 0.212 0.247 0.9388 0.495 0.545 0.0771 0.3745 0.6234 0.3263 0.6031 0.4502 0.7396 0.244
                                      
Current returns (Rt) for year t are the buy and hold returns for the 12 month period starting four months after year. t-1 fiscal year end. Current earnings (Xt) for the year t is ordinary income, scaled by market  
value at fiscal year end. Future earnings (Xt+i) are the income before extraordinary items for the three years following the current year scaled by market value at fiscal year end (t-1). Future returns are the annual buy and hold  
returns for  the three year period following the current year. DS is the disclosure score.         
 
TABLE 5 
Regressions of current returns on aggregated current and future earnings and interactions with disclosure and controls for the 
determinants of earnings response coefficients and the sign of the dependent variable (n=152) 
Model Growth   Size   BETA   Ownership   Leverage   Loss 
            
Intercept -0.13486  0.08031  -0.07877  -0.14158  -0.16645  -0.41683 
 0.1214  0.647  0.4278  0.4842  -1.48  0.0043 
            
Xt-1 -0.15651  -0.14667  -0.83677  -1.83785  -1.68371  0.29626 
 0.6992  0.8073  0.2693  0.2159  0.0468  0.4114 
            
Xt 0.65574  0.20053  0.76506  1.94998  2.9468  -0.20044 
 0.2069  0.7485  0.1588  0.137  0.0003  0.7534 
            
X3t 0.36481  0.29733  0.31470  0.20283  0.11261  0.4843 
 0.0848  0.2844  0.1215  0.5215  0.6181  0.0072 
            
R3t -0.21021  -0.33211  -0.14181  -0.45897  -0.21968  -0.19236 
 0.183  0.3  0.3433  0.2194  0.1601  0.2037 
            
DS 0.00772  0.01229  -0.00537  0.00409  0.00434  0.02255 
 0.2624  0.139  0.5325  0.5928  0.5356  0.0322 
            
DSt*Xt-1 -0.00772  0.00809  0.04765  0.06238  0.06262  -0.04229 
 0.8524  0.8691  0.4283  0.2442  0.1976  0.1276 
            
DSt*Xt -0.02424  -0.03248  -0.01734  -0.03805  -0.05834  0.04243 
 0.4781  0.4137  0.6075  0.3399  0.0899  0.2886 
            
DSt*X3t -0.00838  -0.00595  -0.00730  -0.00463  -0.00567  -0.02563 
 0.5724  0.6969  0.6352  0.7639  0.7027  0.032 
            
DSt*R3t -0.00485  -0.00458  0.0014  -0.00134  -0.00244  0.01135 
 0.6522  0.7179  0.9053  0.9075  0.826  0.2415 
            
Control -0.00001  -0.05193  0.26163  0.08719  0.03607  0.00695 
 0.4968  0.1868  0.0218  0.7256  0.4821  0.9876 
            
Control*Xt-1 0.000006  -0.01876  -0.14939  1.02015  0.10683  0.10169 
 0.4502  0.913  0.7509  0.5464  0.7031  0.9077 
            
Control*Xt 0.000008  0.13478  0.12888  -1.41167  -0.64533  0.89959 
 0.1339  0.3014  0.7191  0.2918  0.0005  0.3613 
            
Control*X3t 0.00000005  0.01207  0.08221  0.2795  0.10016  0.93081 
 0.7712  0.7892  0.6381  0.4394  0.251  0.2343 
            
Control*R3t 0.0000003  0.02768  -0.17018  0.43657  0.05755  -0.44947 
 0.2286  0.6634  0.2701  0.3716  0.4604  0.4574 
            
Adjusted R2 0.1557   0.1635   0.2210   0.1567   0.2146   0.1511 
 34
Current returns (Rt) for year t are the buy and hold returns for the 12 month period starting four months after year 
t-1 fiscal year end. Current earnings (Xt) for the year t is ordinary income, scaled by market value at fiscal year end 
Future earnings (X3t) is the sum of ordinary income for the three years following the current year scaled by market 
value at fiscal year end. Future returns (R3t) are the buy and hold returns for the three year period following the current 
year. DS is the disclosure score. Growth is defined as the percentage growth in the firm's assets from year t-1 to year t 
Size is the natural log of market value of equity at the end of the firm's fiscal year t-1 Beta is calculated using 
monthly returns from datastream over year t – t+5. Ownership concentration is measured as shares held  
by blockholders including officers, directors (and their families), trusts, pension/benefit plans, and shares held by 
other firms or individuals that hold more than 5%. Leverage is calculated as liability/equity for the fiscal year.  
Loss is an indicator variable that is set equal to 1 when ordinary income is negative and zero otherwise. 
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TABLE 6 
High vs. Low regression (n= 70) 
Model       MV   OWN   LEVERAGE   BETA   GROWTH   LOSS 
               
Intercept  -0.44055  -0.3205  -0.4188  -0.7316  -0.45520  -0.44767  -0.46569 
  0.0063  0.4396  0.2922  0.0001  0.0153  0.0075  0.0017 
               
Xt-1  2.92749  1.8064  3.70773  2.81031  0.87131  3.07106  3.08546 
  0.0376  0.4229  0.2218  0.0425  0.5996  0.0373  0.0149 
               
Xt  -0.06087  0.02425  -2.05133  3.17887  1.91779  -0.10683  -0.01539 
  0.9511  0.9869  0.2972  0.0108  0.070  0.9167  0.9884 
               
X3t  0.74153  0.17376  1.8818  0.36194  0.66418  0.7057  0.74981 
  0.006  0.7893  0.0982  0.2493  0.0799  0.0123  0.003 
               
DS  0.35825  0.52351  0.34875  0.25134  0.00407  0.41707  0.31494 
  0.0515  0.0565  0.1107  0.1485  0.7398  0.0511  0.0576 
               
DS*Xt-1  -2.82897  -4.26185  -3.7603  -1.67888  0.01341  -3.75489  -3.78196 
  0.0541  0.0374  0.0736  0.2338  0.8842  0.0408  0.0076 
               
DS*Xt  0.77475  0.91659  1.33919  0.09975  -0.07279  0.58738  1.60286 
  0.4529  0.4224  0.2545  0.9197  0.1566  0.6029  0.1351 
               
DS*X3t  -0.60431  -0.94664  -0.8426  -0.40202  -0.000512  -0.64488  -0.79585 
  0.0649  0.0406  0.0436  0.2359  0.9797  0.0825  0.01111 
               
R3t  -0.44759  0.2921  -0.89475  -0.4171  -0,.31018  -0.43665  -0.43759 
  0.0086  0.6202  0.0483  0.0178  0.1224  0.0135  0.004 
               
DS*R3t  0.19127  0.54441  0.3502  0.18785  0.00824  0.18133  0.35491 
  0.3624  0.155  0.14  0.3898  0.5894  0.4616  0.065 
               
Control    -0.0349  0.01865  0.15846  0.35635  -1E-09  -0.43967 
    0.6725  0.9722  0.0311  0.0573  0.6837  0.1143 
               
Control*Xt-1    0.32919  -1.30477  -0.39855  -0.79727  0.00000001  1.21102 
    0.4158  0.7392  0.3537  0.2864  0.4237  0.1584 
               
Control*Xt    -0.03066  2.65063  -1.18529  0.02838  0.000000006  -1.74164 
    0.8818  0.2194  0.0004  0.9503  0.4733  0.075 
               
Control*X3t    0.12003  -0.66253  0.10978  -0.66202  0.000000003  1.62099 
    0.356  0.4706  0.4113  0.1301  0.4822  0.005 
               
Control*R3t    -0.15422  0.67619  0.04273  -0.19886  0.000000001  -1.45212 
    0.2167  0.2995  0.6369  0.3993  0.849  0.0043 
               
Adjusted R2   0.2196   0.1996   0.1978   0.3451   0.2597   0.1779   0.3969 
Current returns (Rt) for year t are the buy and hold returns for the 12 month period starting four months after year   
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t-1 fiscal year end. Current earnings (Xt) for the year t is ordinary income, scaled by market value at fiscal year end  
Future earnings (X3t) is the sum of ordinary income for the three years following the current year scaled by market  
value at fiscal year end. Future returns (R3t) are the buy and hold returns for the three year period following the current 
year. DS is the disclosure score. Growth is defined as the percentage growth in the firm's assets from year t-1 to year t  
Size is the natural log of market value of equity at the end of the firm's fiscal year t-1 Beta is calculated using monthly returns from  
datastream over year t – t+5. Ownership concentration is measured as shares held by blockholders including officers, directors 
(and their families), trusts, pension/benefit plans, and shares held by other firms or individuals that hold more than 5%.  
Leverage is calculated as liability/equity for the fiscal year Loss is an indicator variable that is set equal to 1 when ordinary 
income is negative and zero otherwise.           
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